In this chapter I shall conclude my discussion of the implications of utilitarianism for the question of the moral standing of animals, by considering what a utilitarian should say about the value of animal life.

DYING, KILLING, AND HARMING

I argued in Chapter 3 that utilitarians are committed to extending the principle of equal consideration of interests to animals, and that this would then imply that it is morally wrong to cause an animal to suffer, except in unusual circumstances. Some utilitarians, including Singer, have thought that the principle of equal consideration applies to animals very differently when it comes to the question of killing them. Some have argued, indeed, that there is no moral objection to killing an animal, provided that the death is unexpected and painless. We then get a moral position that does not entail moral vegetarianism, while it would rule out hunting and factory farming. Alternatively, some have argued that, while there are moral objections to killing animals, the value of animal life is much lower than that of persons. So although it is wrong to kill an animal for no reason, much less reason is required than is necessary to justify the killing of a person. The main arguments for these views will be considered in later sections. I shall begin by drawing some preliminary distinctions.