Our next virtue is one that is much more familiar as an object of moral esteem, justice. Historically, justice has been widely regarded as a central virtue. Indeed, justice is seen as so integral to morality that people often refer to the “just” and the “moral” interchangeably. Everyone demands justice; the charge that an action or policy is unjust tends to invite universal condemnation. And while individuals may differ over the exact demands of justice, one also finds near consensus that injustice stems from selfishness. It is the drive to advance their own interest that leads some people to treat others unjustly.

Rand disagrees. It is not egoism that stands in the way of justice, she contends, but the lack of it – the lack of thoughtful, rational egoism. Treating people as they deserve is not inherently proper, with justice a freestanding, intrinsically compelling duty. Nor does justice demand self-sacrifice. In Rand's view, the exercise of justice is a practical necessity for human life. In explaining her position, we will see that Rand correspondingly espouses other unconventional views in regard to justice, urging a readiness to judge other people, for instance, holding that forgiveness is not a virtue, and holding that egalitarianism, far from being the paradigm of justice, is actually its antithesis.