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Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Tara Smith
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
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Summary

While several of the virtues that Ayn Rand advocates are familiar in name, the moral code that she defends is a bold departure. Ethics is not essentially social, in her view; it does not revolve around a person's relationship to others. Even more at odds with prevailing orthodoxy, Rand rejects altruism, which, however diluted its actual practice, is still widely assumed to be the ultimate moral ideal. Less recognized and equally important, however, Rand's ethics is a departure from conventional conceptions of egoism. Although recent discussions of virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and ethical naturalism logically raise questions about the moral status of egoism, ethicists have been slow to confront these. This is largely, I think, because of the images of egoism that have historically been presented as altruism's alternative. As long as egoism is portrayed as materialistic, hedonistic, emotion-driven, or predatory, we can readily sympathize with those looking elsewhere for guidance.

The essence of egoism, in Rand's view, is “concern with one's own interests.” What is mistaken about most of the attitudes and practices commonly labeled “selfish” is not the pursuit of what is good for oneself, but warped ideas of what a person's self-interest is and of how he can truly serve it. Rand's ethics is animated by the recognition that human life can be sustained only by specific types of actions. This unshakeable fact gives rise to the need for a moral code to guide individuals' actions.

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Chapter
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Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics
The Virtuous Egoist
, pp. 284 - 286
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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  • Conclusion
  • Tara Smith, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167352.011
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  • Conclusion
  • Tara Smith, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167352.011
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Tara Smith, University of Texas, Austin
  • Book: Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167352.011
Available formats
×