from Part V - Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 November 2021
Conceptual Semantics is a thoroughly mentalist theory of meaning, language, and thought (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976; Jackendoff, 1983, 1987a, 1990, 2002, 2012; Pustejovsky, 1995; Pinker, 2007; plus closely related work broadly in the Cognitive Grammar tradition by Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 2000; and many others). The theory represents a fundamental break from traditional formal semantics, and it has consequences not only for philosophy of language, but also for philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and possibly even ethics. The present chapter sketches a few of the many issues treated within this theoretical worldview, in the hope of capturing the spirit of the enterprise.
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