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169. - Skepticism

from S

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Michael Della Rocca
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

Spinoza is regularly accused of not taking skepticism seriously. Such a neglect on Spinoza’s part would be disappointing, especially in light of the deep, varied, and prominent philosophical engagement with skepticism among Spinoza’s predecessors and contemporaries. This charge against Spinoza is perhaps encouraged by the mocking tone he takes in his harsh and apparently unargued dismissal of the skeptic at TIE[48].

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Chapter
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The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 489 - 492
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Bolton, M. (1985). Spinoza on Cartesian doubt. Noûs, 19, 379–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2007). Spinoza and the metaphysics of scepticism. Mind, 116, 851–74.Google Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2019). The elusiveness of the one and the many in Spinoza: Substance, attribute, and mode. In Stetter, J. and Ramond, C. (eds.), Spinoza in Twenty-first-Century American and French Philosophy (pp. 59–86). Bloomsbury.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perler, D. (2018). Spinoza on skepticism. In Della Rocca, M. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza (pp. 220–39). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Popkin, R. (2003). The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford University Press. Chapter 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Primus, K. (2021). Reflective knowledge. In Melamed, Y. (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza (pp. 265–75). Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Renz, U. (2022). Spinoza’s epistemology. In Garrett, D. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 2nd edn (pp. 141–86). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

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