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4 - Deception as a means to an end

An instrumental approach

from Part I - Motivations for dishonesty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2016

Jan-Willem van Prooijen
Affiliation:
VU University Amsterdam
Paul A. M. van Lange
Affiliation:
VU University Amsterdam
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Summary

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Chapter
Information
Cheating, Corruption, and Concealment
The Roots of Dishonesty
, pp. 55 - 72
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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