Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- PART I EXPANDING JUDICIAL ROLES IN NEW OR RESTORED DEMOCRACIES
- 1 The Politics of Courts in Democratization
- 2 Fragmentation? Defection? Legitimacy?
- 3 Constitutional Authority and Judicial Pragmatism
- 4 Distributing Political Power
- 5 The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court into an Arena for Political Contestation
- Part II EXPANDING JUDICIAL ROLES IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES
- PART III FOUR “PROVOCATIONS”
- Conclusion Of Judicial Ships and Winds of Change
- Index
- References
5 - The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court into an Arena for Political Contestation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- PART I EXPANDING JUDICIAL ROLES IN NEW OR RESTORED DEMOCRACIES
- 1 The Politics of Courts in Democratization
- 2 Fragmentation? Defection? Legitimacy?
- 3 Constitutional Authority and Judicial Pragmatism
- 4 Distributing Political Power
- 5 The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court into an Arena for Political Contestation
- Part II EXPANDING JUDICIAL ROLES IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES
- PART III FOUR “PROVOCATIONS”
- Conclusion Of Judicial Ships and Winds of Change
- Index
- References
Summary
“In the process of transformation of a post-colonial regime, judicial leadership matters. Public Interest Litigation began with a letter addressed to the Supreme Court from an inmate imprisoned in the South of India. After I read the communication, I decided to visit the poorest areas in India. I spoke with the less advantaged citizens and I got to know their needs. Based on those needs, I developed my own social philosophy and promoted important changes within the Supreme Court.”
– From my interview with Chief Justice N.P. Bhagwati in New Delhi, India, on July 17, 2010Between 1929 and 2000, the legislative and judicial branches of the Mexican government were subordinated to the executive's control. In theory, the separation of powers was recognized by the dominant political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), as a leading tenet defining the governmental structure. However, in practice, the president limited the powers of the other branches through various constitutional reforms. These institutional reforms effectively restricted the Mexican Supreme Court from properly functioning as arbiter between the presidential and congressional powers, and from protecting fundamental rights. The court system essentially preserved authoritarian rule and the Mexican Supreme Court turned into a passive and unimportant institution. Judges aligned themselves with the executive in an effort to avoid any kind of confrontation. As Domingo (2004) describes, the judiciary responded to the wishes of the executive as expressed through a number of formal and informal pressures and incentives such as political rewards and career incentives.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Consequential CourtsJudicial Roles in Global Perspective, pp. 138 - 160Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013
References
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