Tunisia is unique. Of the four regimes examined by this book, it is the only one to have made the transition from competitive authoritarianism to democracy. And, of the numerous Middle Eastern and North African countries directly affected by the Arab Spring, it is the only one in which pro-democracy protestors have come close to realising their original goals. In the years since the Arab Spring began, large parts of Ben Ali's regime have been dismantled. A new, progressive constitution has been introduced. Opposition parties have been established and legalised. And free and fair elections have been held. In Tunisia alone have the anger and ambitions which drove and, for a time, defined the Arab Spring been harnessed to any satisfactory extent. The country remains the most hopeful point on a regional political map that is, in turns, disappointing and tragic.

That Tunisia's demonstrations proved more successful than those elsewhere speaks of their instinctive originality. Tunisia's protestors were pioneers, the first in the region to react in this way at this time. And, while they certainly came to draw succour from some of the groups and actions they inspired elsewhere, they remain the initiators of this particular round of popular regional protest. Theirs was an organic moment, a passionate and devastating response to the actions of the police, the security forces, the government and the regime. And, in responding this way, they established Tunisia as the unlikely epicentre of the turmoil that quickly escalated into the Arab Spring.

So implausible did Ben Ali's demise seem to country and regional analysts in the months leading up to his fall, that most did not even entertain the possibility that he could be removed in circumstances as fast paced and dramatic as those that transpired, let alone consider and dismiss such notions. Indeed, so stable and secure did his regime appear that the respected London-based think tank, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), made no mention of Tunisia in its 2010 Strategic Survey, which it published just three months before Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation. And the IISS was not alone in failing to anticipate the regime's collapse. As Schraeder and Redissi observed, ‘to say that Ben Ali's sudden fall caught specialists by surprise would be an understatement’.