French spies claimed that the Coalition armies likewise needed time to recover from weeks of combat, fatigue, and privation. Many Allied soldiers contracted typhus after moving into billets recently occupied and infected by French troops. Most Allied commanders dismissed ideas of a winter offensive without first resting and reinforcing their armies. In addition, the French recognized the Coalition's diplomatic needs. The Allied sovereigns and ministers required time to deliberate over the events of 1813 – the destruction of the French Empire east of the Rhine and the resulting fate of millions could not be decided over night. This respite enabled the French to reorganize their forces by rallying stragglers, reequipping the soldiers, refitting the horses, and refurbishing the artillery. Marmont, Victor, and Macdonald anxiously awaited the arrival of conscripts to complete their battalions and squadrons. Regardless, the initiative clearly belonged to the Allies. The Coalition enjoyed vast numerical superiority; the great victory at Leipzig and the French evacuation of Germany provided momentum. Ultimately, this factor limited the freedom of action of the three French marshals – Macdonald, Marmont, and Victor – assigned to command the cordon along the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. A surprise attack at an unassuming point along the frontier remained ever present and dictated their actions. All decisions depended on their ability to interpret the enemy's intentions.