Contention over military operations must be viewed within the larger context of Coalition politics, national self-interest, and the grand strategy of the three eastern powers. Before the battle of Leipzig, the general objective of the Alliance was to liberate central Europe from French control. Yet the attainment of this goal would provide only one essential component of each power's complex and unique grand strategy. Aside from Metternich's subtle undermining of the Kalisch–Breslau agreement, no serious dissension in Coalition politics could be perceived while the three continental powers cooperated to complete this core task. However, upon reaching the Rhine, they could not agree on their next and ultimate objective: should they continue the war to overthrow Napoleon or should they negotiate a peace with the French emperor? At this moment, the facade of the concert ended, and the masks were torn off. Liberating Germany provided only one step, albeit a monumental step, toward the achievement of greater national security objectives. Russian – and by extension Prussian – as well as Austrian grand strategy demanded more than reaching the Rhine could provide, although Metternich perceived he was much closer to the realization of his goals than Alexander. As a result, Coalition politics immediately eclipsed both military operations and military cooperation. Naturally, Metternich wanted the Alliance to follow a course that reflected Austria's grand strategy and was conducive to acquiring Austrian national security objectives.