The penultimate chapter analyses the long-term build-up and the short-term trigger that led to Glubb’s sudden dismissal on 1 March 1956. It examines the relationship between Hussein and Glubb and between Hussein and Britain within the context of the strains and stresses facing the allies, including the conflict with Israel, the rise of Arab nationalism, and the pressures of the Cold War. Focusing on the struggle for control of the Arab Legion from 1953, this chapter reveals that Glubb's dismissal was indicative of the breakdown in mutual dependency. International factors, including the rise of Nasserism, made Britain more dependent on the Jordanian connection. These same factors, though, including Egypt's vehement criticism of Glubb, made Hussein less dependent on the prevailing relationship with Britain. This manifested itself in Hussein's desire to wrest control of the Arab Legion from Glubb and Britain's refusal to comply. Instead, the British sought to intrigue against those deemed to be influencing the king. Hussein nonetheless began a process of Arabising the Legion in 1955 and this process was expedited when the threat of a second Arab-Israeli War emerged at the start of 1956. Hussein faced the prospect of not being able to support his Arab allies because of Glubb's opposition and after three year's of frustration Hussein decided that Glubb had to go.