When the Greater Transjordan partition scheme was agreed in February 1948 it was not anticipated that the end of the Palestine mandate would descend into full blown war between Israel and the Arab states, but it did. This chapter examines the role played by Glubb and the Arab Legion during the first two rounds of official fighting during the summer of 1948. It details how the secret pre-war negotiations continued to shape the 1948 War. While Abdullah backed away from the original plan, owing to pan-Arab pressure, Glubb continued to adhere to the scheme of occupying the Arab areas of Palestine and acquiesced in the establishment of Israel. By distinguising between the influence of Abdullah and Glubb, chapter three reconciles the fighting between the Arab Legion and the Israel Defence Forces, particularly in Jerusalem, with the Arab Legion’s otherwise limited approach to the conflict. Glubb's autonomy was limited and pressure from Abdullah on the one hand, and the rank file of the Arab Legion on the other, caused the Arab Legion to engage in more real fighting than Glubb hoped. As far as possible, however, Glubb sought to avoid military confrontation and where offensive action was approved, it was designed for political rather than military purposes.