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2 - Reacting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2015

J. David Velleman
Affiliation:
New York University
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Summary

There are people whom I like despite knowing that they aren't very likeable, and then there are people whom I know to be likeable even though I just don't like them. Similarly, there are some jokes that I laugh at while judging that they aren't funny, and other jokes in which I can see the humor without being at all disposed to laugh. But when I say that I find someone likable, or find something funny, I indicate that I am doing some third thing. On the one hand, I am not just liking or laughing; I am discovering – “finding” – some quality that merits a response. On the other hand, I am not simply judging that the relevant quality is present; I am finding it with the relevant sensibility, precisely by responding affectively rather than judging. I am detecting likeability or humorousness with the appropriate detector, namely, liking or laughter.

To find someone likeable or admirable or enviable, to find something interesting or amusing or disgusting – these are what might be called guided responses, responses that are somehow sensitive to indications of their own appropriateness. Guided responses are not value judgments, since they are still conative or affective rather than cognitive attitudes. But they resemble judgments in being regulated for appropriateness, and so they are more than mere responses. Finding someone likeable is more judgmental than merely liking him, but it need not entail passing judgment on his likeability.

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Chapter
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How We Get Along , pp. 35 - 58
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • Reacting
  • J. David Velleman, New York University
  • Book: How We Get Along
  • Online publication: 05 July 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808296.004
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  • Reacting
  • J. David Velleman, New York University
  • Book: How We Get Along
  • Online publication: 05 July 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808296.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Reacting
  • J. David Velleman, New York University
  • Book: How We Get Along
  • Online publication: 05 July 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808296.004
Available formats
×