Given the history of commentary on the topic, we should note to begin with that here we are discussing what Kant thought ASA is like, not the role it plays in the subjective deduction. The latter is a topic for Part II of Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. Most of Kant's discussion of ASA is in two places: the chapter on the Paralogisms in the first edition and TD in the second, much of the treatment of the topic having moved from the former to the latter in the meantime. Here we will consider the doctrine that emerges and will not pay much attention to why it emerges in just these passages or what role they play in the overall project of the Critique. Commentators on Kant have not taken much notice of his ideas about how either ASA or the referential apparatus we use to achieve it is special; neither topic is even mentioned by Strawson, Walker, Ameriks, Guyer, or Kitcher. Among recent writers, Allison is one of the few who clearly recognizes that Kant at least identified ASA, and Rosenberg talks about what are in fact some aspects of it. Remarkably enough, even Powell does not discuss it. That is partly because Kant's treatment of the topic is extraordinarily forbidding, even by his standards. However, few philosophers have paid much attention to ASA outside the circle of Kant scholarship, either. In this chapter, I will try to lay out Kant's complete theory.