This chapter is for those who would like a sketch of Kant's overall programme in the Critique of Pure Reason, how the mind fits into it, where he discusses the topic, and some of the main exegetical problems. Nowhere in the first Critique, indeed nowhere in any major work except the Anthropology, does Kant offer a sustained, single-minded discussion of the mind. When Kant does discuss the mind, it is invariably in the context of other issues, and he says only as much as he needs to say to serve his immediate need. The same is true of the Critique of Pure Reason; in both editions the mind and its awareness of itself are mentioned in many places, but properly discussed in none. Recall the view Kant himself took of the status of his enquiry into the mind in the preface to the first edition: “This enquiry… [into] the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests … is of great importance for my chief purpose,… [but] does not form an essential part of it” (Axvii). In effect, he is warning us not to expect any sustained discussion of the mind in the work to follow. (Kant did not retain this passage in the second edition, but the sentiment it expresses continued to apply.)