Throughout Part one I invoked the perspective of a model citizen of a modern western society. I used this character as a foil to help bring out the problems with the bracketing strategy. But no light was shed on the content of his or her views. All we know about him or her is that he or she rejects the bracketing strategy.

In the remainder of this book I argue that such a citizen should endorse a particular perfectionist account of political morality, one that gives the value of personal autonomy pride of place. I also argue that a strong commitment to personal autonomy is not incompatible with perfectionist political action designed to promote good and discourage bad pursuits.

The account of political morality I defend is incomplete. The focus is squarely on the value of personal autonomy. Other values are not discussed, except indirectly. The account also does not specify in any detail what institutional arrangements best promote autonomy. Despite these (severe) limits, it does seek to show that autonomy-based political morality is rationally well-grounded and that it qualifies as a form of perfectionism. In this way, the account complements the argument of Part I. It further substantiates the thesis that liberal perfectionism has a stronger claim to acceptance than the best account of anti-perfectionist political morality.