There is not a clear, settled understanding of ‘perfectionism’ in contemporary political philosophy. The term is used to refer to different ideas and theories. Consider, for example, these three recent characterizations of perfectionist political morality.

1. (a) Perfectionism is the view that a society “ought to arrange institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximize the achievement of excellence in art, science or culture.”

2. (b) Perfectionism supports “the following standard of political evaluation: The best political act, institution, or government is that which most promotes the perfection of all humans.”

3. (c) Perfectionism is the view that “the state has the responsibility and the right to foster the good, the well-being, flourishing, and excellence, of all its citizens and to discourage them, even coercively, from at least some of the actions and dispositions which would injure, degrade, or despoil them, even some actions and dispositions which as such are ‘self-regarding.’”

These characterizations purport to tell us what is distinctive about perfectionism, but they emphasize different things.

The primary objective of this chapter is to present a general account of perfectionism that removes some of the ambiguities surrounding the term and makes it clearer how it will be used throughout this book. Working with this general account, the chapter also rebuts a number of common objections that have been raised against perfectionism.

Perfectionism is committed to the general thesis that political authorities should take an active role in creating and maintaining social conditions that best enable their subjects to lead valuable and worthwhile lives.