The Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia on November 7 came as no surprise to Lloyd George and his colleagues who in recent months had despaired over the inability of the Provisional Government, crippled by factionalism and inertia, to restore discipline in the army and order in the home administration. Lloyd George had no use for socialism, less so for the tyrannical form which Lenin, Trotsky and their associates represented. Yet, it is quite clear that British and Allied intervention in Russia was not the result of an intense hatred of the revolutionary nature of the Bolshevik regime. Had Lenin been willing to fight the Germans, the British would have embraced him regardless of his politics, just as they extended their hand to Joseph Stalin a quarter of a century later. It is equally apparent that the decision to intervene was neither deliberate nor premeditated, but came about imperceptibly, by small increments, the product of the march of events. What is uncertain is whether the Allies initially acted out of a desire to overthrow the Bolshevik regime or rebuild the eastern front to prevent the Germans from concentrating their full strength in the west. British policymakers in the beginning pursued a twisted and contradictory policy, namely, to maintain unofficial contacts with both the Bolsheviks and opposition forces.

The rule of the Bolsheviks created much fear and uncertainty in London. One concern was that Britain held much of Russia's debt (though by no means as large as France's).