Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Maps
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Lloyd George at War
- 1 Setting the Stage
- Part I The Home Front
- Part II Strategy and the War
- 5 The First Attempt at a Unified Command
- 6 Facing the Submarine Menace
- 7 Prelude to Catastrophe
- 8 The Horror of Passchendaele
- 9 The Peripheral War
- 10 The Quest for a Negotiated Peace
- 11 The Creation of the Supreme War Council
- 12 The Plans for 1918
- 13 Before the Storm
- 14 Crisis on the Western Front
- 15 The Maurice Affair
- 16 The Origins of Intervention in Russia
- 17 The German Advance Halted
- 18 The Turn of the Tide
- 19 The Road to the Armistice
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
9 - The Peripheral War
from Part II - Strategy and the War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Maps
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Lloyd George at War
- 1 Setting the Stage
- Part I The Home Front
- Part II Strategy and the War
- 5 The First Attempt at a Unified Command
- 6 Facing the Submarine Menace
- 7 Prelude to Catastrophe
- 8 The Horror of Passchendaele
- 9 The Peripheral War
- 10 The Quest for a Negotiated Peace
- 11 The Creation of the Supreme War Council
- 12 The Plans for 1918
- 13 Before the Storm
- 14 Crisis on the Western Front
- 15 The Maurice Affair
- 16 The Origins of Intervention in Russia
- 17 The German Advance Halted
- 18 The Turn of the Tide
- 19 The Road to the Armistice
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
Summary
Apart from the desultory action in German East Africa, Britain was involved in three subsidiary campaigns in the east when Lloyd George became prime minister in December 1916: Mesopotamia, the Balkans and Egypt. Of the three eastern theaters, Mesopotamia was the most badly managed and the most inhospitable. After the surrender of a British-led army (made up largely of Indian troops) at Kut in April 1916, direction of the front passed from the military authorities in Delhi to the War Office. Robertson, despite his hatred of sideshows, understood that for the sake of Britain's prestige and the security of India, a withdrawal was out of the question. But he wanted operations conducted at minimal costs so that troops would not be diverted from Haig's army in large numbers. Under his stewardship there was a dramatic improvement in communications, supplies and administration as well as an increase in forces. In the second week in December 1916 Gen. Sir Stanley Maude, the British commander, was authorized to organize an advance, though no grand objectives were set. By then Maude had received reinforcements to the point where he held an advantage of roughly three to one in manpower (150,000 as against 48,000) over the Turks and possessed far more artillery. He began a slow, methodical advance and over the course of the next three months, ejected the Turks from their positions along the Tigris, culminating in the recovery of Kut on February 24, 1917. The remnant of the defeated army fled in disorder toward Baghdad.
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- Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918 , pp. 139 - 154Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2009