Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Part 1 Puzzles, paradigms and problems
- Part II Law and order
- Part III South African common law A
- Part IV South African common law B
- 11 Creating the discourse: customary law and colonial rule in South Africa
- 12 After Union: the segregationist tide
- 13 The native appeal courts and customary law
- 14 Customary law, courts and code after 1927
- Part V Law and government
- Part VI Consideration
- Bibliography
- Index
- Index of legal cases cited
14 - Customary law, courts and code after 1927
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Part 1 Puzzles, paradigms and problems
- Part II Law and order
- Part III South African common law A
- Part IV South African common law B
- 11 Creating the discourse: customary law and colonial rule in South Africa
- 12 After Union: the segregationist tide
- 13 The native appeal courts and customary law
- 14 Customary law, courts and code after 1927
- Part V Law and government
- Part VI Consideration
- Bibliography
- Index
- Index of legal cases cited
Summary
This chapter has two parts: the first is a reprise of the major themes in the state's relationship with African law, while the second illustrates briefly the doctrinal directions taken by the native courts after the passing of the Native Administration Act in 1927. In creating a separate court system for Africans, the 1927 Act adopted the Transkei formula which gave to magistrates in the native courts discretion as to whether to apply African law. Section 11(1) of the Act provided that
it shall be in the discretion of the Courts of Native Commissioners in all suits or proceedings between Natives involving questions of customs followed by Natives, to decide such questions according to the Native law applying to such custom … Provided that such Native law shall not be opposed to the principles of public policy or natural justice: Provided further that it shall not be lawful for any court to declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or any other similar custom is repugnant to such principles.
But the Act did not make clear how this discretion was to be exercised. Did it mean that the Roman-Dutch common law was to be considered to be the law that usually applied to African civil cases, except in matters peculiar to tribal life and custom, for which there was no common-law provision? Or was it to be taken to mean that African law would usually apply to civil cases between Africans, the only exceptions being those circumstances in which it was impossible to apply the concepts of African law? Unsurprisingly the different divisions of the new native courts initially took different views.
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- Information
- The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902–1936Fear, Favour and Prejudice, pp. 328 - 358Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001