One of the themes running through much recent work in economic anthropology has been the utility or otherwise of a distinction between two types of exchange. A recent and succinct definition of this distinction is that given by Chris Gregory. ‘Commodity exchange’, he writes, ‘is an exchange of alienable things between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal independence’, whilst ‘non-commodity’ or ‘gift exchange’ is an ‘exchange of inalienable things between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal dependence’ (Gregory 1982: 12). In many ways, Gregory's distinction is similar to that made by the substantivists between ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ economies, and has its roots in such nineteenthcentury distinctions as that made by Maine between ‘Status’ and ‘Contract’ or Tonnies' distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.

The problem with such a distinction, however, is that although its generality makes possible the generation of ‘grand theory’, its generality also prevents us from recognising that there are significant differences between the various phenomena lumped together under such headings as ‘the gift economy’ or ‘the profit economy’ or whatever. This has been remarked upon by a number of writers. MacCormack, for instance, writes of the ‘somewhat baffling mist of uncertainty’ (1976: 89) which surrounds such terms as ‘reciprocity’, and goes on to distinguish a number of ways in which the term ‘reciprocity’ has been used by anthropologists. Similar problems exist when one starts using the concept of ‘commodity’ or ‘commodity exchange’.