7 - Bautzen
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2015
Summary
The lack of experienced cavalry continued to hamper Napoleon after the Allies crossed the Elbe. With his mounted arm unable to maintain contact with the enemy, he could not determine the direction of Wittgenstein's retreat. Thus far, the Allies had proved two of Napoleon's assumptions wrong: they did not defend the Elbe and they did not separate, although he still counted on this happening at any moment. As of 12 May, he did not know where their main body stood. He so desired to see them separate that he convinced himself that it would happen despite lacking hard evidence. Certain that the Russians remained on the great east–west highway to Breslau, he did not know if the Prussians had followed or had moved north to defend Berlin, which appeared the natural response for them to make.
Napoleon's first step on 12 May officially dissolved Eugene's Army of the Elbe, summoning its staff to join the imperial maison and sending his stepson to Italy via Munich. To intimidate the Austrians, he would form a corps of observation on the Adige River consisting of all troops of the Kingdom of Italy and the Illyrian provinces. Napoleon directed Macdonald's XI Corps toward Bischofswerda on the highway to Bautzen. General Pierre-Joseph Bruyères's 1st Division of Light Cavalry would screen Macdonald's march east. Napoleon's orders to Macdonald explained that Eugene's departure signaled the marshal's complete control of XI Corps, meaning he should communicate directly with Berthier. In essence, Macdonald now commanded the vanguard of the Grande Armée, and with it came certain expectations.
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- Napoleon and the Struggle for GermanyThe Franco-Prussian War of 1813, pp. 298 - 335Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015