6 - The Elbe
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2015
Summary
Around 2:00 A.M. on 3 May, Miloradovich received orders to march seven miles northeast along the right bank of the Elster from Zeitz to the village of Predel. There he would unite with Duke Eugen's II Infantry Corps to form the rearguard of the Allied army as it retreated from Lützen. After requisitioning several wagons from the nearby villages to use to transport his infantry and having kept his corps in a state of readiness throughout the night, Miloradovich immediately began the march. His main body reached Predel, less than five miles southwest of Pegau, at daybreak. For the retreat on the 3rd, Wittgenstein divided the Allied army into two columns based on nationality: on the left, the Prussians marched to Borna while the Russians withdrew to Frohburg on the right. After the French pulled out of Leipzig, Kleist's Cossacks reoccupied the city on the 3rd, but Wittgenstein's orders to retreat prompted them to follow the rest of the corps through Wurzen and across the Elbe by way of the pontoon bridge at Mühlberg. Bülow, who had driven the French from Halle on the 2nd, retreated across the Elbe to cover Berlin.
Numerous wagons carried the wounded from Pegau through Groitzsch on the road to Borna. Further east, the Russian parks and baggage proceeded along the Penig–Freiberg road to Dresden. Again, faulty Russian staff work plagued the operation. As for issuing instructions to the corps commanders, Volkonsky relied on Auvray to determine the direction of the retreat while Auvray believed Volkonsky would arrange the details of the march and so did nothing. This blunder and the overlooking of many details rendered an orderly retreat from the battlefield impossible. “At the very first step the instability of the duality of command was proven,” judges Bogdanovich. “Had the bravery and perseverance of the Allies on 2 May not made such a deep impression on the enemy,” explains Caemmerer, “the aimlessness of the departure certainly would have had evil consequences. As it was, they found time to gradually solve even this difficult task.”
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- Napoleon and the Struggle for GermanyThe Franco-Prussian War of 1813, pp. 268 - 297Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015