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9 - War accepted but unsought

Russia’s growing militancy and the July Crisis, 1914

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2014

By
Ronald P. Bobroff
Edited by
Jack S. Levy  and
John A. Vasquez
Ronald P. Bobroff
Affiliation:
Oglethorpe University and Wake Forest University
Jack S. Levy
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
John A. Vasquez
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
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Summary

In July 1914, the Russian government reacted to developments in a fashion that transformed a local Balkan war into a continental conflict. While concerns about the sovereignty and security of Serbia and about Austrian intentions in the Balkans played their roles, by the summer of 1914, the Russian leadership acted in an atmosphere of real distrust of Germany that had built up over a decade of misunderstanding and rivalry. A string of diplomatic crises increased Russia’s suspicions of German intentions in the Near East, a region of strategic, economic, and cultural interest to Russians. Vital trade relations between the two were increasingly strained as Russia grew to resent German economic power, especially in the context of a renegotiation of a major trade treaty. In this context, Russia’s changing leadership perceived German manipulation of Austria during July 1914 and thought that the only way to preserve its prestige in Europe, as well as to slow German penetration into a region vital to its interests, would be to deter action by the Central Powers through a strong show of resolution via the mobilization of its army. While these measures increased the threat of a war that Russia did not want, it felt only such a demonstration could make an impression on German leaders. The failure of the Russian deterrent helped to bring the outbreak of the First World War.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Outbreak of the First World War
Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making
 , pp. 227 - 251
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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