Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgements
- List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The 1970s: A Decline in Anglo-American Specialness and US–UK Relations with Latin America
- 2 The Special Relationship and the Falklands War
- 3 Friend or Foe? The US Invades Grenada
- 4 Vested Interests: US Involvement in the Anglo-Guatemalan Dispute
- 5 Nicaragua: The Allies Stand Together
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Interviewees
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgements
- List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The 1970s: A Decline in Anglo-American Specialness and US–UK Relations with Latin America
- 2 The Special Relationship and the Falklands War
- 3 Friend or Foe? The US Invades Grenada
- 4 Vested Interests: US Involvement in the Anglo-Guatemalan Dispute
- 5 Nicaragua: The Allies Stand Together
- Conclusion
- Appendix: Interviewees
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Reagan and Thatcher forged a formidable alliance in a time of increasing Cold War tension and omnipresent fears of communist expansionism. Their close working, and indeed, personal, relationship was supported by a mutual respect and admiration, by shared fiscal and political ideologies and a strong anti-communist rhetoric. Despite the changing domestic and international realities of the UK and the US, both leaders were committed to a strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countries. Their relationship had an ease and level of familiarity that weathered their often diverging strategic interests, particularly in Latin America. Despite their often seemingly incompatible individual foreign policy objectives, the relationship continued to evolve and deepen. This strengthening in relations repaired the cleavages that emerged through challenges presented in the Latin American region during the 1980s.
As has been shown, the Falklands War had many implications for the Special Relationship. There was a discernible lack of US support of its transatlantic ally, the UK, in the early stages of the war, and US efforts to try to negotiate a settlement that would safeguard Argentine interests infuriated Thatcher and her supporters in the Cabinet. This was potentially damaging to the concept of a Special Relationship and threatened to invalidate the argument that such a relationship operated under Reagan and Thatcher. The initial US neutrality was seen as evidence in the UK of its desire for hegemony in the Latin American region. Thus, the conflict highlighted an asymmetry in strategic interests between both countries. The UK was ardent in its conviction that Argentina's occupation of South Georgia and later the Falkland Islands was an act of calculated aggression. It believed that it was entitled to rely upon its transatlantic partner for swift and uncompromising support. The Prime Minister, in particular, was aghast at the US decision to remain neutral in the early stages of the conflict. This was an affront to British pride both at home and in the wider international community. There was an important lesson to be learned in that the British could not always depend upon the US for political support. Thatcher was forced to become more intransigent in her position when dealing with Reagan. The Prime Minister worked fervidly to change the President's stance.
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- Reagan and Thatcher's Special RelationshipLatin America and Anglo-American Relations, pp. 250 - 260Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2015