The question of Belizean independence was an important issue for both the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the early 1980s. For the UK, Belizean independence represented an opportunity to reduce its financial obligations in maintaining a former British colony. It also afforded the UK an opportunity to secure a Belizean commitment to the British Commonwealth. The US saw Belizean independence as a means to counter Soviet expansion in the region and as a bulwark against the possible expansion of leftist guerrilla activity from neighbouring Honduras. This was particularly important to the Reagan administration given the perceived communist threat in the region from Cuba, Nicaragua and El Salvador. A democratic Belize would provide the US with a valuable political and ideological ally given its strategic location bordered on two sides by both Honduras and Guatemala. The US also hoped that involvement in the Belizean issue would help it to establish closer ties with Guatemala. Improved US– Guatemalan relations would allow the US to explore the possibilities of renewed US–Guatemalan military trade and, to a lesser extent, the construction of a US naval base in Guatemala.

This chapter will examine the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute over the territorial integrity of Belize. US participation in negotiating a settlement of the Belizean question at the encouragement of the UK will be closely examined, as will the simultaneous developments in US–Guatemalan relations. It will critically assess the impact of US strategic interests in mediating the dispute upon the development of Anglo-American relations during this time. As such, the chapter offers a unique opportunity to assess a previously neglected aspect of Anglo-American relations. To date, there has been little written on the Anglo-Guatemalan territorial dispute with a few notable exceptions detailing the historiography of the dispute prior to 1981. However, the dispute in terms of its importance to the development of Anglo-American relations under Reagan and Thatcher has, until now (to the best of my knowledge), remained unpublished. Accordingly, much of this chapter is based upon the analysis of primary documents accessed in the US and the UK (including documents released by the TNA in August 2013, such as PREM 19/959, PREM 19/1048, PREM 19/1153 file series and in August 2012 from the FCO 46/2848, FCO 46/2850 and FCO 46/2879 file series).