Securities Against Misrule was the title of a work by Bentham from 1822–23, one of several writings on a proposed constitution for Tripoli. The main idea was already stated in Political Tactics (1789):

The aim of the present book is to develop, generalize, and, to some degree, modify the claim made in the sentence I have italicized.

Before deciding on the title, I thought of calling the book Bentham against Condorcet. In Chapter 1 I argue, in fact, that the social-choice tradition stemming from Condorcet has little relevance for the normative theory of collective decision making. In Chapter 3 I make a similar claim with regard to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. By contrast, Bentham’s relentless realism and his insight into the operations and the failings of actual institutions provide, or so I shall argue throughout the book, a superior guide to institutional reform. To get a feeling for the drift of my argument, readers are encouraged to consult the list – which is far from exhaustive – of Benthamite schemes that I offer in the Conclusion (p. 272).