Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Normative Study of Collective Decision Making
- 2 Ignorance, Secrecy, and Publicity in Jury Decision Making
- 3 A Dialogue with Bentham
- 4 The Optimal Design of Constituent Assemblies
- 5 Cross-Voting: A Study in Failure
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2013
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Normative Study of Collective Decision Making
- 2 Ignorance, Secrecy, and Publicity in Jury Decision Making
- 3 A Dialogue with Bentham
- 4 The Optimal Design of Constituent Assemblies
- 5 Cross-Voting: A Study in Failure
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Information
- Securities against MisruleJuries, Assemblies, Elections, pp. 289 - 314Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013
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