There is a generic problem in human relationships. Consider the following situation between two sides: a dominant side (this could be an individual or a government) and a subordinate side (which I refer to as a victim). Suppose the dominant side has been using repression to control the behavior of the victim, but now he decides to step down from the position that has given him control over the means of repression. To protect himself, he decides to negotiate a pact with the victim. According to this pact, the dominant side would retire from the position of authority in exchange for the victim's promise not to seek justice for the harm that was done to her. The problem is that this pact is not enforceable, since the victim is better off seeking justice than keeping her promise of amnesty. Once the dominant side retires, he has no means of protecting himself and the victim may deal with him as she desires. The dilemma features prominently in pacts concerning exchanges of amnesty for free elections. In these instances, the literature on negotiated transitions predicts that autocrats concede to democratization only after they are guaranteed immunity for past human rights violations. Examples of such institutional guarantees include constitutions that render retroactive legislation illegal or electoral laws that give the outgoing regime an upper hand (Colomer 1991; Colomer 2000; Omar 1996; Paczkowski 2000; Przeworski 1992; Sutter 1995).