Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of East Central European Political Organizations
- 1 INTRODUCTION
- Part I Skeletons in the Closet
- 2 COMMITTING TO AMNESTY
- 3 THE KIDNAPPER'S DILEMMA
- 4 HOSTAGES AND SKELETONS IN POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
- Part II Out of the Closet
- 9 EPILOGUE: BETWEEN AGENTS AND HEROES
- Appendix A Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 3
- Appendix B Answers of MPs and Their Constituents to “More Should Be Done to Punish People Who Were Responsible for the Injustices of the Communist Regime”
- Appendix C Sampling Technique and Transitional Justice Survey Questionnaire
- Appendix D Birth and Death of Parliamentary Parties by Their Position Regarding Lustration
- Appendix E Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 7
- Appendix F Lustration Laws by Target, Targeted Activity, and Sanction Type in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
2 - COMMITTING TO AMNESTY
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of East Central European Political Organizations
- 1 INTRODUCTION
- Part I Skeletons in the Closet
- 2 COMMITTING TO AMNESTY
- 3 THE KIDNAPPER'S DILEMMA
- 4 HOSTAGES AND SKELETONS IN POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
- Part II Out of the Closet
- 9 EPILOGUE: BETWEEN AGENTS AND HEROES
- Appendix A Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 3
- Appendix B Answers of MPs and Their Constituents to “More Should Be Done to Punish People Who Were Responsible for the Injustices of the Communist Regime”
- Appendix C Sampling Technique and Transitional Justice Survey Questionnaire
- Appendix D Birth and Death of Parliamentary Parties by Their Position Regarding Lustration
- Appendix E Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 7
- Appendix F Lustration Laws by Target, Targeted Activity, and Sanction Type in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
There is a generic problem in human relationships. Consider the following situation between two sides: a dominant side (this could be an individual or a government) and a subordinate side (which I refer to as a victim). Suppose the dominant side has been using repression to control the behavior of the victim, but now he decides to step down from the position that has given him control over the means of repression. To protect himself, he decides to negotiate a pact with the victim. According to this pact, the dominant side would retire from the position of authority in exchange for the victim's promise not to seek justice for the harm that was done to her. The problem is that this pact is not enforceable, since the victim is better off seeking justice than keeping her promise of amnesty. Once the dominant side retires, he has no means of protecting himself and the victim may deal with him as she desires. The dilemma features prominently in pacts concerning exchanges of amnesty for free elections. In these instances, the literature on negotiated transitions predicts that autocrats concede to democratization only after they are guaranteed immunity for past human rights violations. Examples of such institutional guarantees include constitutions that render retroactive legislation illegal or electoral laws that give the outgoing regime an upper hand (Colomer 1991; Colomer 2000; Omar 1996; Paczkowski 2000; Przeworski 1992; Sutter 1995).
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- Skeletons in the ClosetTransitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, pp. 33 - 41Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010