Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of East Central European Political Organizations
- 1 INTRODUCTION
- Part I Skeletons in the Closet
- 2 COMMITTING TO AMNESTY
- 3 THE KIDNAPPER'S DILEMMA
- 4 HOSTAGES AND SKELETONS IN POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
- Part II Out of the Closet
- 9 EPILOGUE: BETWEEN AGENTS AND HEROES
- Appendix A Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 3
- Appendix B Answers of MPs and Their Constituents to “More Should Be Done to Punish People Who Were Responsible for the Injustices of the Communist Regime”
- Appendix C Sampling Technique and Transitional Justice Survey Questionnaire
- Appendix D Birth and Death of Parliamentary Parties by Their Position Regarding Lustration
- Appendix E Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 7
- Appendix F Lustration Laws by Target, Targeted Activity, and Sanction Type in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
3 - THE KIDNAPPER'S DILEMMA
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of East Central European Political Organizations
- 1 INTRODUCTION
- Part I Skeletons in the Closet
- 2 COMMITTING TO AMNESTY
- 3 THE KIDNAPPER'S DILEMMA
- 4 HOSTAGES AND SKELETONS IN POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
- Part II Out of the Closet
- 9 EPILOGUE: BETWEEN AGENTS AND HEROES
- Appendix A Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 3
- Appendix B Answers of MPs and Their Constituents to “More Should Be Done to Punish People Who Were Responsible for the Injustices of the Communist Regime”
- Appendix C Sampling Technique and Transitional Justice Survey Questionnaire
- Appendix D Birth and Death of Parliamentary Parties by Their Position Regarding Lustration
- Appendix E Mathematical Proofs to Chapter 7
- Appendix F Lustration Laws by Target, Targeted Activity, and Sanction Type in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
In the “kidnapper's dilemma,” a kidnapper abducts a victim and demands ransom in exchange for releasing her. However, once the ransom is paid out, the kidnapper is better off doing away with the victim. After all, she may provide the police with information identifying him. The victim cannot credibly commit to not revealing her abductor's identity to the police. The game has precisely the same structure as the Simple Transition Game. The strategy of releasing the victim is weakly dominated by disposing of her. How can the abducted victim save her life? How can she make her promise to the kidnapper credible? A possible solution to this dilemma, suggested by Thomas Schelling (1980), runs as follows: Suppose the victim happened to have committed some heinous crime and can supply her abductor with evidence of this crime. If she were to reveal the identity of the kidnapper, he would uncover the evidence against her. Since the disutility from being held responsible for such an act outweighs the victim's utility from punishing the kidnapper, she refrains from revealing his identity and the optimal solution is ensured. The victim “has a skeleton in the kidnapper's closet,” and the abductor will reveal it if he himself is revealed by the victim. This secret information makes the victim's commitment not to reveal any information to the police credible.
The Kidnapper's Dilemma in Pacted Transitions
In the East Central European pacted transitions, the embarrassing skeletons are files of former dissidents who were secret police informers.
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- Information
- Skeletons in the ClosetTransitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, pp. 42 - 57Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010