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7 - PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2010

Saul Brenner
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina
Harold J. Spaeth
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Summary

According to the legal model, Supreme Court justices decide cases based on the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of the relevant legal provision, the intent of the people who framed the provision, stare decisis, and the balancing of social interests.

In this chapter we will test the extent to which the justices in the overruling cases voted in accord with one element of the legal model – stare decisis. Examining overruling cases to study the justices' adherence to precedent is a peculiar and a biased choice, for in these cases a majority of the participating justices voted to overrule a precedent.

Why did we select the overruling cases? We did so because we had no other choice. Ideally, we would also have analyzed cases in which the majority considered altering precedent, but did not do so. Unfortunately there is no way we can ascertain if such behavior occurred. The majority or plurality opinion writer rarely indicates that overruling a given precedent was considered but rejected. Indeed, for a controlling opinion to communicate this information would probably send an unwanted signal to lower court judges and future litigants, inviting them to pressure the Court to reconsider its decision.

Neither can we assume the majority considered altering a precedent simply because dissenting justices favor its abandonment. The majority and minority do not necessarily disagree on all the arguments. The majority, for example, might believe that its position does not depend on the precedent that the dissenters desire to overturn.

In contrast, when the Court overrules a precedent, all the participating justices usually express their views about its alteration.

Type
Chapter
Information
Stare Indecisis
The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946–1992
, pp. 72 - 88
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1995

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