V - The Separation of Substance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2009
Summary
In the interpretation of Aristotle's account of substance I have proposed thus far, I have claimed that Aristotle believes that by denying separation he can uphold the epistemological, and, as I will argue in Chapter VI, ontological priority of substances, where those requirements are understood in very Platonic terms. I have claimed further that my interpretation of the motivations for Aristotle's view of substance makes understandable his account of how we come to have knowledge. Nevertheless, as I said in Chapter I, even as Aristotle criticizes Plato for separating the Forms, he says of substances that they must be separate. In Metaphysics VII 1, for example, Aristotle says:
Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be primary [prōton]; but substance is primary in every sense – in formula, in order of knowledge, in time. For of the other categories none can exist independently [chōriston], but only substance. And in formula also this is primary; for in the formula of each term the formula of its substance must be present. And we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we know each of these things also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.
(1028a31–b2)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Substance and Separation in Aristotle , pp. 83 - 99Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1995