Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I TERRORISM: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
- PART II WHY MORAL CONDEMNATIONS OF TERRORISM LACK CREDIBILITY
- PART III DEFENDING NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
- Introduction: the ethics of war-fighting: a spectrum of possible views
- 8 The realist challenge to the ethics of war
- 9 An ethic of war for reasonable realists
- 10 Walzer on noncombatant immunity as a human right
- 11 The supreme emergency exception
- 12 Rights theories, utilitarianism, and the killing of civilians
- 13 Immunity rights vs. the right of self-defense
- 14 A rule-utilitarian defense of noncombatant immunity
- 15 Why utilitarian criticisms of noncombatant immunity are mistaken
- 16 Is noncombatant immunity a “mere” convention?
- PART IV HOW MUCH IMMUNITY SHOULD NONCOMBATANTS HAVE?
- Conclusion: terrorism and the ethics of war
- Bibliography
- Index
13 - Immunity rights vs. the right of self-defense
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I TERRORISM: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
- PART II WHY MORAL CONDEMNATIONS OF TERRORISM LACK CREDIBILITY
- PART III DEFENDING NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY
- Introduction: the ethics of war-fighting: a spectrum of possible views
- 8 The realist challenge to the ethics of war
- 9 An ethic of war for reasonable realists
- 10 Walzer on noncombatant immunity as a human right
- 11 The supreme emergency exception
- 12 Rights theories, utilitarianism, and the killing of civilians
- 13 Immunity rights vs. the right of self-defense
- 14 A rule-utilitarian defense of noncombatant immunity
- 15 Why utilitarian criticisms of noncombatant immunity are mistaken
- 16 Is noncombatant immunity a “mere” convention?
- PART IV HOW MUCH IMMUNITY SHOULD NONCOMBATANTS HAVE?
- Conclusion: terrorism and the ethics of war
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
If we take rights seriously, how do we resolve the tension between different parts of the right to life? How do we tell which takes precedence in conflict situations? Is it the right of people not to be attacked? Or the right of people to defend themselves when their lives are threatened? A common philosophical method for trying to deal with hard questions like these is to begin with easy cases and see if we can extrapolate from them. Perhaps this familiar strategy can help us to determine whether we should accept absolute noncombatant immunity or recognize exceptions in extreme cases when attacking civilians is the only means of resisting an extraordinary threat.
If we decide that defensive rights take precedence, then people who are in dire enough circumstances may have a right to engage in terrorist acts, whether they be bombings of cities by powerful air forces or the use of small bombs in markets and buses. If we decide that immunity rights take precedence, then no matter how dire the circumstances or how severe the threat, no one has a right to protect themselves by killing innocent people.
THE SIMPLE MODEL OF JUSTIFIABLE DEFENSE IN ORDINARY LIFE AND IN WAR
In standard, uncontroversial cases of justified self-defense, there is no clash between immunity rights and defensive rights. This is what makes these cases uncontroversial. If someone unjustifiably tries to kill you, you have a right to defend yourself from attack and to use lethal force if necessary.
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- Information
- Terrorism and the Ethics of War , pp. 175 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010