Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- A note on the texts
- Introduction
- Part 1 THE PASSIONS IN GENERAL
- 1 The sensitive appetite
- 2 The definition of passion
- 3 The activation of passion
- 4 The morality of the passions
- Part 2 PARTICULAR PASSIONS: THE CONCUPISCIBLE PASSIONS
- Part 3 PARTICULAR PASSIONS: THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - The sensitive appetite
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- A note on the texts
- Introduction
- Part 1 THE PASSIONS IN GENERAL
- 1 The sensitive appetite
- 2 The definition of passion
- 3 The activation of passion
- 4 The morality of the passions
- Part 2 PARTICULAR PASSIONS: THE CONCUPISCIBLE PASSIONS
- Part 3 PARTICULAR PASSIONS: THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
To understand the passions, one must know “where” the passions are located in a human being. This requires Aquinas to identify the “seat” or “subject” of the passions. Thomas identifies the subject of the passions as the “sensitive appetite.” When Aquinas speaks of the sensitive appetite, he supposes its place in a more comprehensive teaching about the soul and its powers. Setting the “vegetative” and “locomotive” powers of the soul aside, we may focus on what Aquinas means by the core notion of “appetite” (§1.1). Though “appetite” does have a univocal meaning, it is irreducibly differentiated into three types–natural, rational, and sensitive. Aquinas gives a preliminary explanation of sensitive appetite by situating it “between” natural appetite (§1.2) and rational appetite (§1.3). Why does Thomas hold that the primary object of appetite is good, and that there is no appetite for evil as such? Aquinas's teaching on the priority of good over evil provides the first clue for understanding why he orders the passions in the manner that he does (§1.4).
THE APPETITIVE POWER IN GENERAL
Aristotle defines soul as “the first actuality of a physical body potentially having life” (De anima 2.1, 412a28) and “the what-it-is-to-be for a body of this sort” (412b12). He proceeds to identify three types of soul in human beings: intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative. After discussing the soul's essence and its types, Aristotle moves to isolate the dunameis of the soul – a term variously rendered as “capacities,” “faculties,” or “powers” (potentiae).
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- Thomas Aquinas on the PassionsA Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22–48, pp. 13 - 28Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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