Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T06:33:31.413Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Overcast, Paperclip, Osoaviakhim - Looting and the Transfer of German Military Technology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2013

Detlef Junker
Affiliation:
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany
Get access

Summary

World War II was a war of science and technology. By 1944 that truth was recognized by almost everyone, and certainly by leading officers in the U.S. armed forces. The spectacular mid-1944 debut of Germany's “vengeance weapons” - the jet-powered V-1 cruise missile and the rocket-powered V-2 ballistic missile - drove home that point even more firmly. Although ultimately ineffective, those weapons also raised the specter of a future “push-button” war fought over enormous distances - a specter even more real to the handful of decision makers who knew of the Manhattan Project to build an atomic bomb.

On August 21, 1944, the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff created the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS), a joint operation, to coordinate the seizure of German weapons and technology by special “T-Forces” accompanying the ground units then breaking out from Normandy. However, the first technical intelligence team to enter Paris a few days later had already been formed in 1943. Major General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, had created the Operation Alsos to seek out evidence of a German atomic bomb. Other American teams and organizations soon arose in imitation of Alsos and CIOS, or in response to the vision of farsighted military leaders like General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), who formed a “Scientific Advisory Group” in fall 1944 to investigate the advanced technologies needed to maintain American air superiority in the postwar era.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×