Book contents
- What is a Person?
- What is a Person?
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Constructing the ‘Mainline Tradition’
- Part II No God, no Soul: What Person?
- 8 Virtue, ‘Virtue’, Rights
- 9 Descartes on Soul, Self, Mind, Nature
- 10 Personal Identity from Hobbes to Locke
- 11 After Locke
- 12 Sympathy or Empathy: Richardson, Hume, Smith
- 13 Ambiguous Rousseau’s Soul and ‘Moi’
- 14 Kant’s Rational Autonomy
- Part III Toward Disabling the Person
- Part IV Persons Restored or Final Solution?
- Epilogue or Epitaph?
- Appendix The World of Rights Transformed Again
- Bibliography
- Index
11 - After Locke
from Part II - No God, no Soul: What Person?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2019
- What is a Person?
- What is a Person?
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Constructing the ‘Mainline Tradition’
- Part II No God, no Soul: What Person?
- 8 Virtue, ‘Virtue’, Rights
- 9 Descartes on Soul, Self, Mind, Nature
- 10 Personal Identity from Hobbes to Locke
- 11 After Locke
- 12 Sympathy or Empathy: Richardson, Hume, Smith
- 13 Ambiguous Rousseau’s Soul and ‘Moi’
- 14 Kant’s Rational Autonomy
- Part III Toward Disabling the Person
- Part IV Persons Restored or Final Solution?
- Epilogue or Epitaph?
- Appendix The World of Rights Transformed Again
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In the course of the eighteenth century Locke’s work on personal identity was followed up in divergent ways: some pursued his thoughts in the same direction, emphasizing especially the ‘science-fiction’ accounts he gave of the possibility of brain-fission, and generating further problems not only about the diachronic continuity of the person but eventually, as in the case of William Hazlitt (whose work in this area was almost entirely neglected at the time), as to whether it is rational to worry about our future selves, immortal or not.1 Other post-Lockeans, like Stillingfleet, Butler and Reid saw grave moral and spiritual danger in Locke’s claims, above all in that he seemed to suggest that persons are to be viewed not in terms of continuing substances but in terms of relations between material parts of the human being.
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- Information
- What is a Person?Realities, Constructs, Illusions, pp. 108 - 116Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019