Although ancient and medieval thinkers regularly discuss self-awareness and Augustine emphasizes the importance of the ‘I’ and the ‘first-person’ stance, we have seen that pre-modern accounts of persons involve far more than identifying the personal with consciousness or self-awareness; indeed, they pay specific attention to the nature and activity of the complex subject-substance which is self-aware. Hence a basic concern – not only among dualist Platonists of various sorts – was the relationship between the ‘I’ and the world, including the body; and in the first instance between the ‘I’ and a soul which is not merely a mind yet in some way controls and is responsible for the body. The problem, as we have seen, goes back to the pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades; it disturbed Augustine who came to abandon the identification of the person with the soul but could not explain the nature of the ‘person’ – that strange ‘mix’ of soul and body – and it was temporarily resolved when the ‘mix’ was accepted in the Middle Ages as explicable in Aristotelian terms as the soul’s being the form of the body: I as person am not a soul, but exist as my soul and body, and I can be understood as what I am via that inclusive combination.