The traditional focus of debate in philosophy of action has been the causal theory of action and metaphysical questions about the nature of actions as events. This lucid and lively introduction to philosophy of action shows how these issues are subsidiary to more central ones that concern the nature of the will, practical rationality and moral psychology. By focusing on the idea that agency involves causal sensitivity to reasons, Rowland Stout shows how agency becomes one of the most useful ways into the philosophy of mind: if one can understand what it is to be a free and rational agent, then one is some way to understanding what it is to be a conscious subject of experience. Some of the questions considered include: is all action intentional action? Is intentional action characterized by its relation with possible justification? Do beliefs motivate actions, or do facts? What is the nature of the causal process of acting? Are intentions independent components in the explanation of action? Although the traditional Davidsonian agenda remains centre stage throughout, Stout locates it historically, alongside the ideas of Aristotle and Kant, and current issues of interest, like externalism, that move the debate beyond Davidson. Action is a fresh and engaging introduction to the many philosophical problems associated with agency and is ideally suited for students taking courses in philosophy of action, philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

"Stout writes clearly and energetically, his arguments are extremely lucid, and his examples engaging. He presents some of the most important topics related to action theory in a fair and accurate manner, and offers a number of insightful discussions of the views of others. Its thoughtfulness and originality should spark new debates. Anybody interested in the philosophy of action and its explanation would do well to read this book"

Source: Times Literary Supplement