In contrast to the pernicious impact of amour-propre that Rousseau details in his conjectural history Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755), he sets out to view himself through the eyes of another in Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, Dialogues (1776). Rousseau embarks upon this painstaking endeavour in order to pass judgement on his actions and to unveil the true nature of ‘Jean-Jacques’, false victim of a universally entrenched conspiracy. In the introductory remarks of this autobiographical fiction, Rousseau writes:

Before Rousseau, Adam Smith also confronted this challenge of how to objectively judge oneself in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) with his conception of the impartial spectator, a theory of conscience in which moral judgement is cultivated through sympathy and imagination. I will trace a Smithian sentiment that I perceive in the radical division of the self dramatised in the Dialogues, with particular emphasis on Rousseau's attempt to liberate his own gaze, enabling it to render an unbiased judgement.

Where Smith extends the domain of the spectator beyond the ocular realm and claims that ‘we must become the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct’ (TMS III.ii.2: 114), Rousseau also attempts to probe beyond the visual surface to examine through careful study the ‘constitution’ of another, who is actually himself. Yet ultimately Rousseau does not seem to position himself as impartial in the Dialogues, but instead occupies the role of his worst enemies, viewing himself in ‘the most deplorable and cruel position in the world’ (Rousseau 1990: 6/OC I: 665). I take as a point of departure Jean Starobinski's (1989: 16) interpretation of Rousseau's self-directed gaze as inward condemnation projected outwards by the imagination, a self-defence mechanism that shifts inner conflict, re-establishing the unity of the ego by obliging it to confront an all-encompassing enemy.