Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preview
- Part II The Main Argument
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
2 - Preview
Small Forces, High Frequencies, and Large Firms
from Part I - Agenda
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2016
Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preview
- Part II The Main Argument
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the FirmFoundations of the Resource-Based View, pp. 10 - 30Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016
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