When the Admiralty came to consider the Baltic at the start of 1808, it was quite evident that substantial forces would be necessary to meet the needs of a complex and demanding situation. They would also require a commander-inchief of considerable ability, capable of handling the defensive problems likely to be caused for the important British maritime trade by Danish and Norwegian gunboats and French, Danish and Norwegian privateers; of judging what offensive action might be taken against the Russians; and whether, if Zealand were not to be retaken, there were alternative bases in the Baltic that might be held. In addition, there was the problem of Sweden, Britain's one remaining European ally, whose young king had dreams of military success to match his great forebears which his abilities and finances failed to match. The previous ambassador in Stockholm, Pierrepont, had sent a damning report in June 1807 on his handling of the Swedish troops in Pomerania which had led to their retreat into Stralsund.

Nelson was dead – and it is far from certain, with hindsight, if he would have accepted such a posting or whether he would have been the right man for such a task. Colin White maintains that the two months Nelson had been Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic in 1801, when he superseded Hyde Parker, were ‘an important turning point in his professional career’ and that he ‘displayed a sure hand in dealing with the intricate diplomacy of the Baltic region’. Roger Knight also tends to support this view, commenting that Nelson’s sudden departure from Reval ‘without the usual courtesies’ was ‘the only time in the Baltic when his diplomatic dealings carried the stamp of his ill-temper at Naples’. I am hesitant to take issue with such eminent current authorities, but I find it difficult to accept their interpretation of the correspondence and events of that time.

Undoubtedly Nelson possessed high administrative skills of which he made good use in his Mediterranean command and one cannot question his powers of leadership and the inspiration he brought to the fleet. But if we look at his contacts with the three northern powers with whom Britain was in conflict, they are those of a military commander, not those of an ambassador.