Introduction: cognitive theories of the emotions

Contemporary philosophers have not, at least until very recently, been much concerned with the study of the emotions. It was not always so. The Stoics thought deeply about this topic. Although they were divided on points of detail, they agreed on the broad outline of an account. In it

Thus, for example, fear was understood as the judgment that some object is harmful followed by a desire to avoid it. When a person is afraid, the relevant desire and belief are (typically) accompanied by some further physiological reaction. Both desire and physiological reaction count as types of affective state.

The Stoics did not need to say that emotions cause the resulting affective states or that emotions are valuational judgments. For the emotions could, in their view, include both the valuational judgment and the resultant affective states. For them, the judgments or beliefs in question were of the same genus as judgments or beliefs about matters unconcerned with action. According to them, the relevant beliefs could be differentiated as stronger or weaker (in terms of degrees of belief), but in no other salient respect. Whatever their disagreements, they were united in rejecting the older Aristotelian idea that some emotions are based on states more primitive and less rational than belief (or judgment).

Why did the Stoics hold this view? There were several reasons.

1. [A] It gave them a way of representing an agent's action as reasonable: the agent has considerations which he/she sees as favouring his/her acting as he/ she does, considerations which make her so acting justified by her own lights. These considerations are encapsulated in the beliefs and desires which provide reasons for their action.

2. […]