Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-wbk2r Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-09-01T22:13:43.994Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Sackett loses heart with Brüning's fall

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2009

Bernard V. Burke
Affiliation:
Portland State University
Get access

Summary

Brüning's resignation came as a great shock to Sackett and took the personal meaning out of his mission to Germany. The ambassador had done all he could for the chancellor, the one person he and his staff felt was destined to prevent Hitler's rise to power in Germany. But now there was nothing they could do. Sackett was thwarted by American foreign policy, which prohibited direct involvement in European affairs. However, even if the United States intervened, there was nothing that could be done to help the chancellor. Not even if France were willing to offer concessions was there any hope of saving his government. The fact is that Brüning was compelled to resign because he had lost the support of the most powerful forces in Germany – forces that wanted a complete break with the Socialists, on whom Brüning was dependent. As Sackett put it, those who brought about Brüning's downfall wanted a sharp division with the Left.

Hindenburg deliberately ignored the parties of the political Right and the conservative interest groups when he appointed Franz von Papen to succeed Brüning. Instead, he turned to individual members of the conservative establishment – the officer corps, the civil service, and the aristocracy. Hindenburg also moved farther in the direction established by Brüning. Neutral experts, who could be relied on to insure that the government would be run efficiently, were favored over representatives of partisan interests. The hope was to restore authority and stability in the state by reviving the ideals of civic virtue and the political relationships of the Bismarckian compromise.The effort was another naive attempt to capture Hitler's support and tame his Nazi movement by meeting the supposed aspirations of his followers.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×