This book began with two questions: “What is the structure of political careers in Brazil?” and “What are some of the observable consequences of political ambition in Brazil?” These questions are at the heart of the theory of political ambition, namely, that individual politicians are motivated by the desire for office, and that they will act strategically to achieve their career goals. This notion is a useful simplification of reality, a heuristic device that provides insight into Brazilian politicians' behavior as well as into other far-ranging questions.

The first section of the book answered the first question, providing empirical evidence to support the notion that Brazilian federal deputies are not primarily motivated by a desire for a long-term legislative career, but rather that their ambitions are directed at positions outside the Chamber, particularly in the executive branch of subnational government. Having described the structure of political careers in Brazil, Section 2 demonstrated how state-level political dynamics affect elections to the national legislature, revealing the pressures on federal deputies to “represent” their state's interests while in Congress. In the third section of the book, I attempted to answer the second question and illustrate the consequences of the combination of federalism and ambition in Brazil. I showed that the reelection assumption cannot explain Brazilian deputies' famous pork-barreling behavior, and how an explanation that relies on extralegislative ambition and pressures from subnational governments, particularly states, provides a better explanation.