American policy toward the rebuilding of the bombed German cities was far less dramatic than the policies that dealt with the political rehabilitation of West Germany, its rearmament and integration into NATO, or even its economic recovery. There was no consistent, high-level American policy on what, if anything, to do about helping the Germans repair the damage left by the war. In the end the Americans developed only what amounted to a relatively modest position on housing construction, though at moments the Americans seemed to be reaching for something grander, such as an attempt to connect urban reconstruction with democratization. Certainly the Germans themselves expected something far greater in the way of American leadership and help than what the Americans finally offered.

Moreover, the modesty of American policy on urban reconstruction is interesting because it clearly contradicts so much popular wisdom. American aid is part of the founding myth of West Germany. Whether one asks Germans or Americans today, it is a common belief that American aid was enormously important in physical reconstruction, just as CARE packages were important for providing food and clothing. There is great symbolic worth in the image of rebuilding what one has destroyed, and there was at least one attempt, unsuccessful at that, to galvanize private support in the United States to aid reconstruction.