Having attained a basic understanding of the acquired and infused virtues, we may proceed to a slightly more complicated discussion regarding the interconnection of the virtues. There are two major schools of thought with respect to this topic. Most modern ethicists think that the virtues are not necessarily connected. According to this view, a person may possess courage without temperance, justice, prudence, or even all three; any virtue may exist independently of any other virtue. In this chapter, I refer to this view as the “isolation thesis,” because those who support it believe that a person can possess a virtue in isolation from the other virtues. The other view, held by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, maintains that in order to possess a single virtue one must possess them all. I refer to this view as the “unity thesis,” because those who support it hold that individual virtues are never found apart from each other. The virtues always form a unity. This chapter contends that the unity thesis is true and the isolation thesis false.

This chapter develops in four sections. The first section considers the case for the isolation thesis as well as the two main objections that its supporters make against the unity thesis. The next section replies to these objections and shows that one cannot correctly understand virtue if one denies the validity of the unity thesis. The third section examines the significance of the findings of the first two sections in light of the Catholic moral tradition. Finally, a summary section reviews the major points both of the current chapter and the whole of Part II.

THE ISOLATION THESIS

As stated previously, the majority of contemporary ethicists contend that it is possible to possess individual virtues in isolation from other virtues.