In his A Dictionary of Philosophy, Professor Antony Flew (or one of his contributors) has written the following on ‘perspectivism’: ‘The view that the external world is to be interpreted through different alternative systems of concepts and beliefs and that there is no authoritative independent criterion for determining that one such system is more valid than another. Perspectivism occurs in many of the writings of Nietzsche, but is best known from the work of Ortega y Gasset’ (1984: 226). It is important that such mistaken impressions be rectified, and it is one of the aims of this chapter to do just that. To imply that Ortega does not believe that there can be an ‘authoritative independent criterion’ for deciding between different perspectives is at best misleading, and at worst, wrong. However, although perspectivism is one of the best-known features of Ortega's thought, it by no means exhausts his ideas about truth. Generally speaking, his reflections on perspectivism are confined to the period prior to that with which this section on his philosophy has primarily been concerned. More specifically, it is in his 1923 book El tema de nuestro tiempo, that the notion receives its most sustained treatment. I propose to deal with it in this chapter precisely because it is an idea with which most people will associate Ortega, but I also propose to examine the reflections on truth found in his mature thought.