INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean was a perennial problem for the Allies, yet there was no good reason why this should have been the case, as their combined navies enjoyed a substantial numerical superiority in practically all classes of warship over the Central Powers and an infinitely better strategic position. Even after the disconcerting episode of the escape of the Goeben and Breslau and Turkey’s subsequent entry into the war, there was little to fear from enemy surface forces, as they could be confined to the Dardanelles and the Adriatic. The chief threat arose from the German and Austrian Uboats, of which there were ultimately about ‘50. They roamed the whole Mediterranean and caused heavy losses. The Allies failed to contain them, despite possessing numerous anti-submarine craft, extensive sea and air patrols and mine and net barrages, notably that across the Straits of Otranto. Though convoys were instituted in 1917, escorts were generally weak and losses continued at a depressingly high rate until the end of the war. In many ways, the Allies’ problems were of their own making, for they failed utterly to coordinate their naval activities and thus nullified their paper and geographical superiority. Mutual jealousies and suspicions, often of ancient lineage, combined with ambitions to be satisfied at the peace conference to frustrate genuine Allied co-operation at the highest levels. The British and French agreed that the Italians were only in the war for what they could get out of it (a charge of which they, too, were not innocent), and considered that the Italians were therefore determined to maintain their fleet in idleness, and thus intact. The Americans prided themselves on having no territorial or other material designs on the Mediterranean; it was a distinctly secondary theatre for them and their military commitment remained small, though the Italians in particular agitated for more assistance from the US Navy. The Italians remained sceptical about American protestations of clean hands and felt that Wilson intended to deprive them of the gains promised to them by the Treaty of London (1915). When American vessels arrived in the Mediterranean, they joined a veritable league of nations fighting the Central Powers there: Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Serbia, Romania and Japan. America found herself in some difficulty, for she had declared war against Germany alone and she never went to war with Bulgaria or Turkey.