We now relate the themes of previous chapters – free choice, familial attachment, personal responsibility and possible harm – to two extremely controversial debates. This chapter deals with the first of these, abortion.

Despite the controversy that surrounds abortion, the aim of the chapter is to identify what can be termed a ‘pragmatic consensus’, or a broad field of opinion in which most of those who think about the issue probably stand. It is this that has arguably enabled abortion to become embedded as an accepted practice in many countries and which therefore deserves consideration for that reason if no other. To this end, the first half of the chapter addresses two questions that will help us to mark out the space of that consensus: should there be abortion on demand and what should the upper time limit for abortion be? The appropriateness of these questions to the pragmatic consensus should become obvious as we proceed. The chapter also explores two further questions, but we will leave these to one side for now.

Abortion on demand

Should there be abortion on demand?

There are various reasons why many feel uncomfortable with the idea of abortion on demand (Cleary, 1983; cf. Glover, 1977, pp 144-5). Wouldn't it encourage women to seek abortion on frivolous grounds? What if some used it as a form of contraception? For many, such doubts represent an insurmountable problem. So where might an ethical justification lie? On what basis could abortion on demand be permissible?

If we decide that abortion is acceptable, why should the motivations of the pregnant women be an issue? If we believe that the foetus is organically and morally indistinguishable from the rest of her body, why insist on imposing procedural hurdles? Abortion is either murder or it isn’t, and we don't excuse murder based on how the killer does or does not feel. So perhaps the requirement to have abortions sanctioned by medical experts and other authorities stems from nothing more than moralistic desires. To make abortion dependent on evidence of medical harm, emotional distress or worthy intentions might encourage women either to worry themselves into the first, fake the second or simulate the third – hardly a basis for ethical decision making.

Consequentialists and Kantians, of course, both downgrade the worth of factors like emotions and motivations.